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Abstract
We examine the performance of active, global real estate mutual funds
(GREMFs), both at sector and individual fund levels. We apply a bootstrap
procedure to separate genuine skills from luck. We find no evidence of skills,
but find evidence of lack of skills in the bottom 10% of funds. We find that
outsourcing has a positive effect on GREMFs but a negative effect on global
mutual funds overall. We also find no evidence of skills in timing or in stock
selection. Overall, our results suggest that there is no benefit to a U.S. domestic
investor from investing in GREMFs.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed a strong growth in global sector mutual funds,
from 26 in 1992 to 291 in 2016, and a growth in assets under management from
$4.5bn to $198bn. Of the 291, 196 were actively-managed and accounted for $170bn
of the assets. And, of the actively-managed sector funds, the real estate sector, with
82, had the largest number of funds and the second largest assets under management
at $41bn.1
For their supposed skills, actively-managed mutual funds charge much higher
expenses than passive funds, with global real estate mutual funds (GREMFs), on
average, charging the highest expenses (155 basis points) among different types of
funds.2 However, despite the importance to investors, there is limited published
research on whether such expenses are justified by fund performance. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to investigate the performance of actively-managed Global Real
Estate Mutual Funds (GREMFs), and to establish whether international investment
improves risk-adjusted returns.
Although identifying underpriced international equities could bring benefits in
terms of return and geographical diversification of risk, significant efforts and costs
are involved as different countries have different institutional contexts and different
levels of market transparency and maturity. Therefore, it is possible that managers
who are based in a local area have specialist knowledge and access to information,
leading to information asymmetry between local and non-local investors, and en-
abling the former better to assess the value of securities. As the international real
estate market is characterised by a high degree of market-specific, value-relevant,
local factors, information about which is generally less accessible and transparent
to outside investors, the information asymmetry is likely to be even more evident
for GREMFs (Hung and Glascock, 2010). Accordingly, it may be more difficult for
them to outperform local managers.
One approach to dealing with the difficulties of international real estate invest-
ment is to sub-contract to experts in local markets. However, Chen et al. (2013)
concluded that outsourcing has a negative effect on mutual fund performance, and
Chuprinin et al. (2015) found the same result for international mutual funds over-
all. Nonetheless, despite these results, given the nature of international real estate
markets, it is not obvious that the same should be expected for GREMFs. Indeed,
Bernile et al. (2015) found that institutional investors, which are located in the
same area as the stocks in which they invest, earn superior returns on these local
investments, and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) found that mutual funds that invest
1Healthcare was the largest by assets under management, with $66.5bn in 2016 but only had 10
funds.
2Based on the expense ratio data from CRSP US Mutual Fund database, and from ICI (Invest-
ment Company Institute) 2016.
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heavily in their local market do better. The results of these two studies suggest that
the same might be possible for GREMFs, so the matter merits investigation.
We are also interested in whether fund managers have skills in choosing the
right geographical areas at the right time or in picking quality stock. We develop
an approach to assessing this. Also, as most funds have both institutional and retail
share classes, we compare their performance.
We take two approaches to assessing performance and to comparing domestic and
global real estate mutual fund performance. First, we consider several return:risk
ratios, specifically the Sharpe Ratio, the Treynor Ratio and the Manipulation-Proof
Performance Measure (MPPM) developed by Goetzmann et al. (2007) and applied
to REITs by Alcock et al. (2013). Second, to assess outperformance, both gross
and net of expenses, we employ the alpha measure, which has been widely used to
examine fund performance, including in studies of domestic real estate mutual funds
(DREMFs) and international equity mutual funds. Previous studies suggest that the
results are sensitive to the choice of benchmarks (Cumby and Glen, 1990; Lin and
Yung, 2004; Hartzell et al., 2010). Various benchmarks have been used, among which
the most frequently used are asset pricing models based on the required returns of
a passive portfolio. Accordingly, we test the appropriateness of a wide variety of
potential benchmarks. We undertake our analysis for the GREMF sector as a whole
and for individual funds. For the former, we also undertake rolling estimates of
alpha to consider its time trend.
Although several recent studies show that some mutual funds may have talents
(Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010; Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2015),
identifying managers with skills is a non-trivial exercise because good past perfor-
mance could simply be the result of luck. Moreover, even if managers are talented
enough to generate gross outperformance, this could be cancelled by their expenses.
Therefore, we address statistical issues that hinder the appraisal of performance,
namely cross-fund dependency, auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity, and which
have not previously been fully considered in the real estate literature. We implement
the bootstrap approach of Kosowski et al. (2006), which accounts for the aforemen-
tioned issues and enables us more effectively to separate skills from luck.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the litera-
ture on the performance of actively managed GREMFs. Section 3 then outlines the
methodology and section 4 explains the data used in this study. Section 5 presents
the empirical results, and section 6 summarises the main findings and draws conclu-
sions.
2 Literature Review
There is a long-established literature on the performance of diversified active funds
with a U.S. market focus (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Ippolito, 1993; Elton et al.,
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1993; Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997). The general conclusion is that,
on average, active funds underperform passive alternatives.
More recent studies draw similar conclusions. Kosowski et al. (2006), in their
examination of the returns of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1975 to 2002,
found that a minority of funds possessed genuine skills to produce outperformance
when operating expenses were taken into account. Fama and French (2010) exam-
ined the net returns of active diversified equity funds from 1984 to 2006 and found
that only the top three percentile funds could add enough value to cover expenses,
and this was attributed to their stock-picking talents. Barras et al. (2010), in a
study of net fund performance from 1975 to 2006, found that 10-15% of the 2076
funds were skilled during different periods before 1996 but none thereafter. They
attributed this to increasing market efficiency, inadequate skills of fund managers,
and the movement of skilled fund managers to the more lucrative sectors, such as
hedge funds. These three papers all used bootstrap approaches.
There is also evidence that funds that concentrate in specific industries perform
better than those that do not (Kacperczyk et al., 2005). This is explained by in-
formation asymmetry, which means that these managers know their sectors better
than other types of fund managers (Kaushik et al., 2010). In contrast, studies which
have considered sector funds (Dellva et al., 2001; Tiwari and Vijh, 2001; Eakins and
Stansell, 2007; Kaushik et al., 2010; MacGregor et al., 2020) have found that some
sectors, such as technology, health care and utilities, can outperform but only during
specific periods. And Khorana and Nelling (1997) suggested that the overall risk lev-
els of sector funds are indistinguishable from small-cap or aggressive-growth funds.
The need to include a sector-based index in the established asset pricing benchmarks,
to account for their sector specific investment styles, has been addressed by these
studies.
As the largest sector among all mutual fund sectors, U.S. domestic real estate
has been the most extensively studied. Earlier studies by Kallberg et al. (2000)
and Gallo et al. (2000) found outperformance when real estate market returns were
poor, which is attributed to real estate market inefficiency. However, more recent
studies (O’Neal and Page, 2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al.,
2008; MacGregor et al., 2020) have found little or no evidence to support significant
outperformance attributable to real estate mutual fund (REMF) managers’ superior
skills, regardless of the benchmarks used for the market or the real estate sector.
Ferreira et al. (2013) considered active mutual funds in 27 countries and used
country-specific Carhart benchmarks. They sought to explain performance by a
variety of fund and country factors and concluded that mutual funds underperform
the market. However, they did not address the issue of non-normality in returns
and did not use a bootstrap approach. Busse et al. (2013) also used country-specific
Carhart benchmarks, which they aggregated into factors for developed and emerging
markets, with both sets being used in the model. They implemented a bootstrap
approach, in line with Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), to
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examine active retail and institutional global mutual funds, and found little evidence
of superior alphas. Although the extreme right tail of the distribution contains some
large alphas, simulations suggest that they are produced more by luck than skills.
The performance of international property companies was examined by Eich-
holtz et al. (2011) during 1996-2007. Their results indicate that such companies
underperformed local property companies in the earlier years because of the polit-
ical environment, the level of economic integration and transparency of the target
real estate markets. However, in later years, the underperformance of international
property companies vanished, suggesting increased market transparency in the in-
ternational real estate industry.
Shen et al. (2012) evaluated the performance of 59 U.S.-based GREMFs during
1998-2008 and used a variety of performance measures, including the Sharpe and
Treynor ratios. They concluded that, before 2007, GREMFs outperformed DREMFs
but this advantage disappeared thereafter. Alcock et al. (2013) considered REIT per-
formance, also using traditional risk-adjusted return performance measures as well as
the Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure (MPPM), developed by Goetzmann
et al. (2007). They concluded (p460) that ‘REIT managers may opportunistically
employ leverage in order to game performance measures’.
Outsourcing is an important consideration. Chen et al. (2013, p. 530) reported
that ‘roughly 41% of [mutual fund] families outsource to some degree’ and that ‘a
typical family on average outsources the management of 26% of its funds’. They
considered mutual funds but explicitly removed international funds and sector funds
from their analysis. They concluded that outsourcing has a negative effect on mutual
fund performance, leading to underperformance of ‘approximately 50bps’ a year
(p525). They attributed this to ’agency costs that make it more difficult ... to
extract performance from an outsourced mutual fund’ (p528). Chuprinin et al.
(2015) found the same result for global mutual funds overall. They concluded that
outsourced funds underperform by 85 basis points a year. They attributed this
to ‘preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs,
trading opportunities, and cross trades’ (p2275).
However, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) found that mutual funds that invest heav-
ily in their local market do better, and Bernile et al. (2015) found, using U.S. states
data, that there is a link between ‘local exposure’ and ’a geographic component in
... performance’, and that ‘the geographical distribution of information about firms’
economic interests generates location-dependent information asymmetry that can
explain institutional investors’ portfolio decisions and performance’ (p2042). Given
the characteristics of international real estate markets, both of these studies suggest
that outsourcing to experts in local markets could be an advantage to GREMFs, so
the matter merits investigation.
Another issue that has been examined is the impact of team management com-
pared to individual management. Bliss et al. (2008) pointed to a growth in team
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management of equity mutual funds, from 30% in 1993 to 56% in 2003. This, they
suggested, could be because ‘groups make better decisions’ or to avoid the negative
impact of ‘stars’ leaving (p110). They used the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method
and the Carhart benchmark but found ‘no statistically or economically significant
differences between individually managed and team-managed mutual funds’ (p.115).
Massa et al. (2010) also considered the issue and again found no significant differ-
ence, using the CAPM and Carhart benchmarks. However, Patel and Sarkissian
(2017), using a different dataset, concluded that team-managed funds have higher
risk-adjusted annual returns by 30-40 bps. None of these explicitly considers global
mutual funds.
The literature also suggests that factors other than outsourcing and team man-
agement, such as size, age, recent performance, capital flows, expenses, number of
funds in the the fund family and size of the fund family, are linked to mutual fund
performance (Bliss et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2013, 2004; Chuprinin et al., 2015; Fer-
reira et al., 2013; Massa et al., 2010; Patel and Sarkissian, 2017) Thus, it is important
to control for these factors.
We are also interested in whether fund managers have skills in investing in the
right geographical areas at the right time and in picking quality stock. Kacperczyk
et al. (2014) considered whether mutual fund managers have timing and stock se-
lection skills and whether these are better in periods of expansion or contraction.
They estimated measures of these skills and concluded that timing ability is higher
in recessions, while stock picking is lower in recessions.3 For GREMFs, Shen et al.
(2012) also considered whether performance could be attributed to timing skills or
stock selection skills. They did so by applying versions of the Treynor-Mazuy and
Merton-Henriksson models.4 They found no evidence of timing skills and some of
stock selection skills.
There is ample empirical evidence to show the violation of the normality assump-
tion (Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010; Cuthbertson et al., 2008), and
that fund returns follow non-standard distributions. To control for this in our study
of GREMFs, we employ a cross-sectional bootstrap approach and rely on inferences
from this. This means that we can more effectively separate genuine managerial
skills from luck in fund performance.
In this study we add to the literature on GREMFs in six main ways. First, we
use the Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure (MPPM) and compare it with
3Kacperczyk et al. (2014, p. 1460) argue that a fund with timing ability overweights high beta
stocks when the market is expected to rise and underweights when the market is expected to fall;
and a fund with high picking ability overweights assets that have high idiosyncratic returns and
underweights assets with low idiosyncratic returns.
4In both cases, additional variables are added to the CAPM: in the former, the market return
above the risk free rate, multiplied by lagged instrument variables, representing public information,
and with the square of the market return above the risk free rate, are added; in the latter, instead
of the squared term, the first difference of the market return above the risk free rate, and this term
multiplied by lagged instrument variables, are added.
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more traditional measures. Second, we undertake formal assessments to determine
appropriate benchmarks. Third, we assess fund performance for the sector and for
individual funds, using a robust bootstrap approach. Fourth, we consider the impact
of outsourcing on fund performance. Fifth, we assess whether fund managers have
geographical timing or stock selection skills and which factors affect these. Finally,
we consider both institutional and retail funds separately.
3 Methodology
3.1 Performance assessment
To assess and compare the performance of active mutual funds that invest either in
domestic (U.S.) or foreign listed real estate equities, we use two different approaches.
First, we use the well-known Sharpe and Treynor ratios, which relate fund return
rates in excess of the risk-free rate to a measure of return rate risk. In the Sharpe
ratio, risk is measured by the standard deviation of the return rates; in the Treynor
ratio, risk is measured by the beta between fund and market return rates, see for
instance Schulz et al. (2019). Both ratios consider only lower moments of return
rate distributions. Fund managers could use strategies such as short selling and
derivatives to improve the ratios at the cost of higher moments. Although extensive
use of such strategies is not permitted for mutual funds, we use also the measure
proposed by Goetzmann et al. (2007). This measure is similar to Morningstar’s risk-
adjusted return rate that is used in the investment industry and which is insensitive
to moment manipulation.5 Of the three measures, only the Sharpe ratio is related
to an equilibrium in a competitive asset market.6
The second approach to assess the performance of funds uses a linear asset pricing
model. In a competitive market, assets will be priced so that the expected return
rate compensates for asset’s risk exposure. As there are several candidates, we
must choose the most appropriate asset pricing model. We motivate next the core
regression equations given a linear asset pricing model and explain how we use the
regressions to choose the asset pricing model for our benchmark. The first core
regression equation is
ri,t = αi + xtβi + εi,t (1)
5The measure assumes a particular utility function for investors and estimates effectively the
welfare under the return rate distribution generated by a fund manager. The coefficient of relative
risk aversion ρ acts as tuning parameter. One can be sceptical about a performance measure that
can be tweaked and we will assess it for different plausible values of ρ.
6The Sharpe ratio is the slope of the capital market line of the CAPM. This model results if
investors have mean variance preferences. The CAPM results also in an expected utility framework
if return rates follow particular distributions (Chamberlain, 1983). However, if fund managers can
manipulate return rate distributions, the less restrictive derivation is no longer appealing and so is
the Sharpe ratio.
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and relates the return rate of asset i in excess of the risk-free rate to a constant, a
row vector xt of traded risk factor realisations multiplied with the factor loadings,
and a noise term. Asset i can be a fund or a portfolio of funds. The chosen asset
pricing model determines the elements in xt. If a set of funds is managed passively,
then we have α = 0 under the correct asset pricing model. As a passive manager
takes risk, but does not try to outsmart the market, an alpha of zero simply implies
that the expected return rate will compensate for the risk taken. If a set of funds
is managed actively, then some funds may have αi > 0, but other may have αi 6 0.
We will use the time series regression in Equation 1 in several places in this paper.
The second core regression equation is
rt = Btλt + αt (2)
and relates the cross section of return rates in excess of the risk-free rate to the
expected premiums λt for the risk factors in period t. Row i of the matrix Bt
contains the factor loadings of asset i with respect to the risk factors of the candidate
pricing model. The loadings in Bt are estimated with observations from previous
periods.7 The λt are estimated for each period separately. As Btλt corresponds to
the required return rates for the assets, the vector αt contains the pricing errors.
For the correct asset pricing model, we expect E[αt] ≡ α = 0 for a set of passively
managed funds. We will use the cross sectional regression in Equation 2 in several
places in this paper.
As should be clear from the discussion above, the correct pricing model will have
alphas for passive funds that are indistinguishable from zero.8 To find this model,
we perform two types of tests. Firstly, we use time series of return rates of portfolios
of passive funds and stack the regression in Equation 1 for all i and t. We run this
system for the different candidate factor models and test whether all elements in the
estimated vector α are jointly zero.
Secondly, we use a robust covariance matrix that allows for heteroscedasticity,
autocorrelation, and cross-sectional correlation of errors between assets. To obtain
further evidence on the asset pricing models, we use Equation 2 to estimate the





αj1j(i) + νi,t (3)
The indicator function Ij(i) becomes one if j = i and zero else. We test whether
the αis are zero for all i, where we use again a robust covariance matrix estimator
7Each row corresponds to the transpose of the estimated vector of factor loadings from the
regression ri,τ = ai + xτbi,t + ei,τ with τ 6 t− 1. We use data from the 36 months preceding t for
estimation.
8Obviously, the same should hold true for individual stocks. However, throughout our analysis,
we work with fund return rates.
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that allows for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of νi,t over time and for cross
correlation of the errors in a given month between assets i and j, i 6= j.
3.2 Performance of fund cross sections
We assess the performance of the cross sections of individual funds that invest in
domestic and foreign listed real estate separately with the bootstrap approach of
Kosowski et al. (2006).9 The basic idea of the approach is intuitive: given a cross
section of funds, we could run Equation 1 for each fund separately and estimate the
α̂i.
10 We can then rank the funds based on the α̂i estimates. Such a relative ranking
is always possible and will give, for instance, a best and a worst fund. But this does
not necessarily mean that the best fund is also a good fund. The manager of the
best fund could have been just lucky.
In our context, it could happen that a larger share of global than domestic funds
seems to perform well simply due to luck. Inference is complicated by the facts that
financial return rates are heteroscedastic and non-normal and that funds can enter
and exist the cross section. Kosowski et al. (2006) suggest a bootstrap approach
to simulate the distribution of t-statistics under the null that no fund manager has
skill and that the funds are ranked by their measured performance. These simulated
t-statistic distributions under the null are then used to assess the significance of the
actual t-statistics.
The bootstrap approach works as follows. First, using the estimated β̂i and the
residuals from the regression in Equation 1, return rate histories rbi,t = xtβ̂i + ε̂
b
t
are simulated for each fund i, where ε̂bt is drawn randomly (with replacement) from
the set of actual residuals for this month.11 Observe that the null of no skill is
imposed on the simulated return rates. The simulated return rate history is then
used in regression Equation 1 as the dependent variable which results in estimates of
α̂bi , β̂
b
i and new residuals. We are only interested in the t-statistic of α̂
b
i , generated
under the null. For given b, this leads to I t-statistics, which can be ranked by size.
Repeating this simulation B times, we end up with B realisations of the largest
t-statistics, B realisations of the second largest t-statistic and so on, each generated
under the null. This simulated null distribution, which takes ranking into account,
allows the appropriate p-values for testing.
9We implement the extended version which allows for cross-sectional correlation in the errors,
see section C. in Kosowski et al. (2006, IV.) for details.
10We will focus in the empirical implementation on the t-statistics for the estimated alphas as
these have better statistical properties and take a fund’s risk taking into account, see Kosowski
et al. (2006, p. 2558).
11We estimate individual equations here, because fund histories cover different time periods.
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3.3 Fund performance and characteristics
Given the pricing errors αi,t of actively managed funds, are there characteristics
that help explain the magnitude of these errors? We examine this with the panel
regression12
α̂i,t = αi + zi,tθ + νi,t (4)
The dependent variable for a fund is computed as the monthly return rate of the fund
in excess of the risk-free rate minus the required return rate estimated from a port-
folio of funds that have a similar size with respect to assets under management. zi,t
contains a list of explanatory variables, such as outsourcing and team-management.
The robust standard errors allow for possible heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation,
and cross correlation in the νi,ts.
3.4 Regional timing and picking skills
Skilled fund managers will generate return rates above those generated by the av-
erage investor by investing in the right regions at the right time (regional timing)
and by investing in the right stocks within the regions (regional picking). To exam-
ine this, we follow Kacperczyk et al. (2014) and decompose the relative return rate










(wik,t − wmk,t)(rk,t+1 − xt+1βk,t) (6)
where K denotes the number of regional markets in which fund i and the benchmark
could have invested in, such as U.S., Pacific Asia, Europe, Middle East and Africa,
Latin America, and others. wik,t is the weight invested in region k by fund i at t. w
m
k,t
is the weight in region k in the chosen benchmark at t. We assume that wik,t > 0. rk,t
is the return rate of assets in region k. To implement this decomposition, we estimate
the betas with rolling windows (see footnote 7) and use xt+1bk,t in Equation 5 and
rk,t+1−xt+1bk,t in Equation 6. We use the robust panel regression model of Equation
4 to explain the variation of these measures over time with fund characteristics in
the same manner as Kacperczyk et al. (2014).
12We also implemented the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression used in Chen
et al. (2013) to derive robust inferences.
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4 Data
4.1 Mutual Fund Data
We consider the monthly performance of GREMFs from January 1992 to December
2016. The data for GREMFs (or global funds) come from the survivor-bias free U.S.
mutual fund database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This
database provides a comprehensive coverage of mutual funds, including monthly
return rates, size (total net asset values), expense ratio, turnover, and load. From
December 2002 onward, the database also provides details of the security holdings
in fund portfolios.13
In line with earlier studies, we start our sample in January 1992 and we cover
the period up to December 2016. The focus of our study is an examination of the
performance of U.S.-registered GREMFs. In the CRSP database, the GREMFs are
classified by CRSP14 as U.S.-based equity funds investing more than 25% of their
assets in foreign real estate securities.15 We only focus on the actively managed
GREMFs, and exclude the passively16 managed index funds from our data. To
address the incubation bias (Evans, 2010), we exclude the returns from the period
before a fund received a ticker17 from NASDAQ. As for all funds, we do not impose
an additional filter for fund size but require that a fund has been in existence for a
minimum of three years to reduce the regression estimation error.
Mutual funds tend to offer different shareclasses18 to investors, even though the
returns come from the same portfolio. The data report net return rates for each fund
shareclass separately. For each fund and month, we compute the weighted net fund
return rate by averaging over the net return rates of a fund’s different shareclasses
using, as weights, the ratios of shareclass net assets to the fund’s total net assets
(TNA). The resulting net return rate is what the average investor receives when
investing in the fund. Shareclass aggregation prevents newly-created shareclasses
of a fund from causing duplication of return data that comes, effectively, from the
13The method used to identify portfolio holdings is explained in Appendix 1.
14CRSP mutual funds adopt the classification and codes provided by CRSP Style Code, based
on the information from fund prospectuses and their investments.
15There are two types of GREMFs: Global Real Estate (GRE) and International Real Estate
(IRE) defined by the proportions of real estate investment outside the U.S. GRE are funds that
invest at least 25% but less than 75% of their equity portfolio in shares of companies engaged
in the real estate industry that are strictly outside of the U.S. or whose securities are principally
traded outside of the U.S. IRE are funds that invest at least 75% of their equity portfolio in shares
of companies engaged in the real estate industry that are strictly outside of the U.S. or whose
securities are principally traded outside of the U.S.
16We follow the procedure of Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) to identify passively-managed funds
- details of the procedure are presented in A.2
17A ticker is an abbreviation used to uniquely identify publicly traded shares of a particular stock
on a stock market.
18Shareclasses can differ regarding their front- and back-end loads paid to brokers, and the con-
tribution to annual operating expenses of portfolio management.
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same portfolio. We also repeat the same procedure to aggregate the institutional
(and retail) share classes as institutional (and retail) funds.
The Outsource variable is defined using the same approach as Chen et al. (2013).
We categorize a fund as being outsourced by comparing its family complex name to
its investment advisory company(ies) name(s). There might be up to two advisors
that manage a fund. If none of these names of advisors matches the fund family
complex, we can identify this fund as being outsourced. Since some advisors with
different names may still be affiliated, we also look into the form ADV for every
family complex.
Table 1 shows, for each year of the sample period, the number of such active
GREMFs (Nt), the total net asset value of GREMFs industry (TNAt =
∑
TNAi,t),









The second and the third columns show that the number of funds and money under
management were mostly increasing throughout the period. The growth of the sector
also resulted in a less concentrated distribution of funds, implied by the decreasing
figures for the Herfindahl Index. The GREMF investment by regions is shown in
Table 2. Analysis of fund portfolio holdings using the information available since
2002 reveals that, on average, about 60% of funds’ assets are invested in U.S. real
estate securities, 20% in Pacific Asian markets, 15% in European markets and the
remaining funds in the African, Latin American and Middle Eastern markets. It
is evident that there is a shift of investments from the U.S. to Pacific Asian and
European markets after 2010.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
4.2 Real Estate Benchmark Data
The choice of a passive real estate benchmark against which to consider the perfor-
mance of GREMFs requires an understanding of the risk exposure of their portfolios.
As GREMFs hold predominantly global REITs and REOCs, we have two choices:
the FTSE/EPRA/Nareit U.S. Real Estate Index with the FTSE/EPRA/Nareit
Global Real Estate Index; and the Wilshire US Real Estate Securities Index (RESI)
with the Wilshire Global RESI. We use the former, which is constructed to represent
the real estate equities market in most developed regions worldwide, covering over
95% of the global markets and with a similar risk profile to GREMFs. These indices
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are available from the start date of our data in 1992, whereas the Wilshire Global
RESI starts in 1993. However, we correlated the monthly returns for the two sets
of indices and they are very close to one: from 1993-2016, the two global indices
correlate at 93.8% and the two U.S. indices correlate at 99.6%; and from 1992-2016,
the two U.S. indices correlate at 99.3%.
In section 5, we consider several benchmark pricing models, alone, with the U.S.
domestic real estate index, and with both the U.S. domestic real estate index and
a global index. In the last of these cases, we remove the U.S. component of the
global index by regressing the global index on the domestic index and extracting the
residuals as an orthogonalized international real estate factor.
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the value-weighted19 and equal-weighted
portfolios of global and domestic REMFs, and the global and domestic real estate
indices, of monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate from January 1992 to
December 2016.
[Table 3 about here]
On average, DREMFs generated higher excess returns than their global counter-
parts, and the domestic real estate index beat the global real estate index. In addi-
tion to lower excess returns, the GREMF industry is less volatile than the DREMF
industry, as indicated by its smaller standard deviation. This calls for a risk-adjusted
measure for the performance of GREMFs.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Introduction
Our interest is in whether the managers of GREMFs have skills. First, we consider
whether GREMFs provide diversification benefits over DREMFs. We are also inter-
ested in whether GREMFs, overall as a sector and as individual funds, can produce
outperformance, both gross and net, against an appropriate risk-adjusted bench-
mark. For the sector as a whole, we examine the time pattern of performance by
estimating rolling windows. We consider which factors explain performance, specifi-
cally we assess the effect of outsourcing. We extend this analysis to an examination
of whether fund managers have skills in the timing of the geographical structure of
their portfolios or in picking stock, and which factors explain each of these. And we
are interested in both institutional and retail share classes.
19We use total net assets of each fund as the weights.
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5.2 The Diversification Benefits of the GREMF Industry
We use net returns and consider three measures of risk-adjusted returns: the Sharpe
Ratio, the Treynor Ratio and the Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure (MPPM).
The last of these was developed by Goetzmann et al. (2007) because they assessed
that most performance measures could be manipulated by managers to improve
their apparent performance. For the MPPM, we use three different values of the
parameter in line with Alcock et al. (2013). In Tables 4, 5, 6, we test for significant
differences in the ratios between DREMFs and GREMFs, overall, and separately for
institutional and retail funds.
The broad pattern is consistent across the measures. For all funds, 1993 was
significantly better for GREMFs but 1992 and 1994 were significantly worse. Then,
from the early 2000s until the Global Financial Crisis, GREMFs tended to do signif-
icantly better. Thereafter, with the exceptions of 2009 and 2012 for some measures,
GREMFs consistently did significantly worse. The broad patterns are repeated when
institutional and retail funds are considered separately. Overall, whichever ratio is
used, for 1992-2016 as a whole, GREMFs always perform significantly worse. In
comparison to Shen et al. (2012), who appear to use gross returns and only consider
1998-2008, the pattern of the signs of the differences is predominantly the same but
the pattern of significance is different. Nonetheless, their overall conclusion is the
same: GREMFs perform worse.
[Table 4, 5, 6 about here]
5.3 Choosing Benchmarks
We turn now to consideration of performance against benchmarks. The first stage
is to choose an appropriate benchmark pricing model. If the pricing model explains
the expected returns of an asset, the constant in the time series regression of the
asset returns on the model factors should be zero. We undertook two tests on
passively-managed global funds: a joint alpha test based on a GMM approach using
time-series regressions for ten decile portfolios on risk factors (Fama and French,
2018); and a joint alpha test using a robust panel approach on pricing errors derived
from Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-stage approach. We tested a wide range of
possible international benchmarks: the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model;
the Carhart four-factor model; the Fama-French five-factor model; and the Fama-
French five-factor model with the Carhart momentum factor. We also tested each
of these alone, then with the U.S. domestic RE index added, and then with the
orthogonalized international index added; and we also tested the RE indices alone.
The results are shown in Table 7. We required that, to be selected, a benchmark
must pass both tests, with and without the RE indices. Only the CAPM and the
Fama-French three-factor models pass, so we use only these for subsequent analyses.
14
[Table 7 about here]
5.4 The Performance of the GREMF Industry
5.4.1 Estimates of Alpha for the Full Period
We start by considering the GREMF sector as a whole. Table 8 presents the results
for the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor benchmarks, both with and with-
out the RE factors, and using equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The
results are shown separately for institutional and retail funds. A number of patterns
emerge:
• all of the gross figures for equally-weighted portfolios are positive, but they
are never significantly different from zero;
• half of the net figures for equally-weighted portfolios are positive and half are
negative, but they are never significantly different from zero;
• 14 of the gross figures for value-weighted portfolios are positive and four are
negative, but they are never significantly different from zero;
• three of the net figures for value-weighted portfolios are positive and 15 are
negative, but they are never significantly different from zero;
• taken together these last four points suggest that larger funds do worse;
• the outperformance is always lower when the real estate factors are included
but it is never significantly different from zero; and
• there is no material difference between institutional and retail portfolios.
Thus, there is no evidence that, as a sector, GREMFs are able to produce risk-
adjusted outperformance.
[Table 8 about here]
5.4.2 Rolling Window Estimates of Alpha
We also produce 36-month rolling window estimates of outperformance (alpha) and
of the risk-pricing factors (betas). These are shown in Figure 1 for the Fama-French
three-factor model. We might have expected some outperformance in the earlier
period because, arguably, the underlying real estate markets were less efficient and
transparent. However, it is clear that there was no significant out- or underperfor-
mance in any period, which is consistent with the previous result.
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For the risk factors, the Fama-French size (SMB) and value/growth (HML) fac-
tors were very rarely priced. But the market beta was almost always priced and has
a value of around 0.4. The domestic real estate factor was always priced but the or-
thogonalized international real estate factor was not consistently priced until around
2006. This suggests a maturing market and a greater awareness of a systematic risk
that needed to be priced.
[Figure 1 about here]
5.5 The Performance of Individual GREMF Funds
5.5.1 Estimates of Alpha
Next, we consider the performance of individual funds. The results are presented in
Table 9, for gross and net returns, and for all funds and, separately for institutional
funds and retail funds. Again, there is no evidence of significant outperformance,
even before expenses are deducted. But there is evidence of underperformance for
the worst two funds and, at 10% significance, for the worst 10% of funds. When
expenses are deducted, the bottom 10% of funds display underperformance. Thus,
while we can find no evidence of performance driven by skills rather than good luck,
we do find substantial evidence of poor performance as a result of lack of skills rather
than bad luck.
[Table 9 about here]
5.5.2 Explaining Alpha
Now, we investigate the relationship between fund performance, as measured by fund
net alpha, and outsourcing and team management. We adopt the basic approach
of Chen et al. (2013). For each benchmark, we estimate two models: first with
expenses, size, age, previous period’s return and previous period’s net inflow of
funds; then we add the number of funds and the value of the funds in the fund
family. The results are shown in Table 10.
We have one striking finding - outsourcing has a significantly positive effect on
performance, at 5% in 10 of the models and 10% in the other two. These positive
results are the opposite of those of Chen et al. (2013) for U.S. domestic mutual funds
and Chuprinin et al. (2015) for global mutual funds, but are consistent with the
findings of Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Bernile et al. (2015) on the importance
of local knowledge and information asymmetry in performance. Given the local
nature of real estate markets, it is not difficult to see the greater importance of
local knowledge and expertise in real estate investments compared to stocks in other
16
sectors. The general negative effect of outsourcing has been attributed to a principal-
agent problem by Chen et al. (2013) and to preferential treatment of in-house funds
by Chuprinin et al. (2015). Whatever the merits of these arguments in the context
of global real estate funds, they are outweighed by the benefits of specialist local
knowledge from subcontracting.
None of the other variables is significant at 5% but there is some evidence at 10%
in the CAPM models of team management having a positive effect and fund size
having a negative effect. The lack of significant variables is, perhaps, to be expected
given the small sample size.
[Table 10 about here]
We repeat the analysis using a panel approach, which allows us to incorporate
the NBER recession variable to test whether performance is better or worse during
recessions. The results are shown in Table 11. The key result of a positive effect on
outsourcing now holds at 10% for 10 of the 12 models but the recession variable is
never significant.
[Table 11 about here]
To be sure that the outsourcing result is not an artefact of our methods, we use
the same approach to examine all global mutual funds. The results are shown in
Tables 12 and Table 13 are very clear: for all global funds, in direct contrast to
GREMFs, outsourcing always has a significantly negative effect for either approach.
This is consistent with the results of Chen et al. (2013) and Chuprinin et al. (2015).
Size tends to have a negative effect on performance, and fund family size always has
a positive effect.
[Table 12 and 13 about here]
5.5.3 Geographical Timing and Stock Picking
We turn now to the issue timing and stock picking as examined by Kacperczyk et al.
(2014). However, as we do not have details of fund holdings, we have adapted their
method to consider geographical regions rather than individual stocks. We assess
whether fund managers have skills in investing in the right region at the right time,
and whether they have skills in picking good stock. Recall that Kacperczyk et al.
(2014) argue that a fund with timing ability overweights high beta stocks (in our
case high beta regions) when the market is expected to rise, and underweights when
the market is expected to fall; and a fund with high picking ability overweights assets
that have high idiosyncratic returns and underweights assets with low idiosyncratic
17
returns. We are interested in the time patterns as well as in the overall effects.
To ensure a large enough sample, we start the analysis in 2003. We undertake the
analysis with the global RE-CAPM which utilized the global real estate index.20
The results are shown in Table 14. When the regional timing is significant, with
the exception of the Global Financial Crisis year of 2008, it is positive. In contrast,
the significant effects of picking are evenly balanced between positive and negative.
Overall, however, neither is significant in any of the models.
[Table 14 about here]
Finally, we use the approach of the analyses reported in Tables 10 and 12 to
consider which factors explain the geographical timing and the stock picking. We
add the NBER recession variable. The results are shown in Table 15. There are
three significant results:
• picking skills are significantly greater for team management, perhaps suggest-
ing the moderating effects of teams compared to individual decision-making;
• timing skills are significantly greater during periods of recession;
• at 10%, flow of funds is positively related to timing, which supports the smart
money hypothesis of Gruber (1996), but could also be explained by greater
opportunities to restructure portfolios when funds are flowing in.
These results differ from those of Kacperczyk et al. (2014) who, in their study
of mutual funds, excluding sector funds, found that picking was poorer in recessions
and that flow of funds was insignificant. They did not consider team management.
[Table 15 about here]
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the performance of U.S.-registered, active, global real
estate mutual funds (GREMFs) during 1992-2016 to establish whether the fund
managers have genuine skills and can produce benefits from global diversification,
or if their performance is the result of luck. We considered both the industry as a
whole, and 76 individual funds, before and net of expenses, and we looked, separately,
at institutional and retail share classes. We used the CRSP Mutual Fund database,
20We also used other benchmark models that passed the asset pricing tests, and found no material
differences.
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which is free of survivor biases, and we controlled for incubation bias. We applied a
bootstrap procedure to separate genuine skills from luck.
First, to investigate the benefits from investing internationally, we compared
GREMF performance to that of DREMFs using several ratios and found GREMF
performance to be worse. Next, we tested a wide variety of benchmark models and
only the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model passed the tests. We used
these alone, then with a U.S. domestic real estate factor and, then, additionally,
with an orthogonalized international real estate factor. We used these benchmarks
to examine the performance of both the GREMF sector as a whole and of individual
funds, and we used recursive estimates to consider the time trends in the performance
of the sector. We found no evidence of outperformance for the sector during any
time period. For individual funds, even before expenses are deducted we also found
no evidence of skills, and evidence of lack of skills for the bottom two funds. When
expenses are considered, we found evidence of lack of skills in the bottom 10% of
funds but no real difference between institutional and retail funds.
We considered the impact on performance of outsourcing, team management
and a variety of other variables. We find that outsourcing has a positive effect
on GREMFs but a negative effect on global mutual funds as a whole. This is a
new result in the literature. Then, we assessed whether fund managers have skills
in the timing of geographical allocations and in stock selection. We found that,
in those years in which there is an impact, it is generally positive for timing and
equally positive and negative for stock selection but, over the full period, there is no
evidence of skills in either. Finally, we showed that stock picking skills are positively
associated with team, rather than individual management; and that timing is better
during periods of recession and is positively associated with inflows on cash.
Thus, while GREMFs may be a convenient vehicle for international real estate
investment, overall, our results suggest that there is no benefit to a U.S. domestic
investor in investing in them.
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Table 1: U.S.-registered Active GREMFs Overview: Number and value of active
GREMFs for the period 1992-2016. All numbers are for the respective year end. Total
net asset value (TNA) is in millions of US dollars ($). Sector concentration of GREMFs is
measured with the Herfindahl Index.
All Funds Institutional Funds Retail Funds
Year Number TNA Concentration Number TNA Number TNA
1992 2 8.31 100.00 1 8.31
1993 3 146.17 100.00 2 146.17
1994 3 106.62 85.38 2 106.62
1995 3 70.76 75.61 2 70.76
1996 4 106.45 40.78 3 59.24 2 47.21
1997 7 634.40 48.81 6 217.63 3 416.77
1998 10 635.60 34.97 7 173.90 6 461.70
1999 10 962.70 43.08 7 106.90 6 855.80
2000 10 1057.00 48.00 8 92.70 6 964.30
2001 11 1250.90 33.95 8 205.50 7 1045.40
2002 11 1695.90 23.63 8 403.70 7 1292.20
2003 12 3061.50 20.25 8 857.90 8 2203.60
2004 15 5708.40 21.19 9 1447.70 11 4260.70
2005 19 8135.60 18.88 13 2461.50 14 5674.10
2006 34 17283.30 9.31 26 5960.60 28 11322.70
2007 52 23454.40 7.12 41 9987.00 44 13467.40
2008 69 15578.10 4.18 46 6274.20 57 9303.90
2009 71 20030.10 4.35 48 8430.40 59 11599.70
2010 65 24189.10 4.69 45 10420.40 55 13768.70
2011 68 24362.90 4.67 49 12239.70 59 12123.20
2012 66 33683.10 4.56 45 17723.40 56 15959.70
2013 70 38997.00 4.52 47 21063.50 60 17933.50
2014 77 45030.10 5.13 52 24550.60 66 20479.50
2015 82 44390.40 4.92 57 25755.80 67 18634.60
2016 82 40664.30 5.19 59 24485.20 67 16179.10
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Table 2: U.S.-registered Active GREMFs Portfolio Decomposition by Regions:
The table presents the percentage of regional risk exposure of the portfolio holdings of U.S.-
registered active GREMFs during 2002-2016 (missing data pre-2006). The data are the
averages over each year, presented in percentages.
Regional Risk Exposure of Portfolio Holdings
Year U.S. Pacific Asia Europe Africa Latin America Middle East
2002 86.09% - - - - -
2003 93.80% - - - - -
2004 89.85% 0.14% - - - -
2005 89.00% - - - - -
2006 94.10% 1.99% 3.46% 0.45% 0.00% 0.00%
2007 82.84% 9.65% 6.73% 0.60% 0.18% 0.00%
2008 85.21% 6.99% 7.27% 0.24% 0.29% 0.00%
2009 93.65% 3.23% 2.73% 0.12% 0.28% 0.00%
2010 67.79% 17.81% 12.82% 0.78% 0.78% 0.02%
2011 51.72% 26.58% 19.78% 0.79% 1.05% 0.09%
2012 51.85% 29.34% 17.27% 0.74% 0.73% 0.06%
2013 49.84% 32.51% 16.56% 0.55% 0.49% 0.05%
2014 50.25% 30.20% 18.51% 0.50% 0.44% 0.10%
2015 54.06% 25.30% 19.60% 0.60% 0.28% 0.15%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14: Regional Timing and Picking: This table presents the average and standard
derivation of the regional timing and picking ability of all GREMFs. We adjust the method
in Kacperczyk et al. (2014) using the regional risk exposure, to measure the regional timing
and picking skills for fund i in region K, including U.S., Pacific Asia, Europe, Middle East
and Africa, Latin America, and others. The regional timing and picking factors are defined
in Equations 5 and 6.
Global RE-CAPM
Year T iming σ(T iming) Picking σ(Picking)
2003 1.24*** 0.70 0.14 0.66
2004 0.63 2.26 -0.43*** 0.72
2005 1.17*** 1.90 -0.55** 1.28
2006 1.47*** 1.43 -0.60** 1.66
2007 -0.38 2.33 -0.55*** 1.11
2008 -1.58*** 3.78 1.24** 2.05
2009 1.37*** 2.49 0.15 3.47
2010 0.18*** 1.30 0.35*** 1.41
2011 0.00 1.02 0.02 0.63
2012 0.03 0.60 0.09** 0.71
2013 0.02 0.52 -0.04 0.74
2014 0.01 0.30 -0.01 0.51
2015 0.01 0.42 0.03 0.71
2016 0.00 0.62 -0.05 0.87
2003-2016 0.30 1.02 -0.02 0.80
36
Table 15: Fund Timing/Picking vs. Fund Characteristics with Fixed Effects:
This table presents panel regression estimates of all GREMFs monthly regional timing and
picking abilities regressed against fund lagged characteristics and regional investments, with
roust standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) clustered by fund. The fund monthly
regional timing and picking abilities are calculated using Equations 5 and 6. Recession is a
dummy variable that equals one if the month is in economic recession according to NBER.
Outsource is a dummy variable that equals one if the fund is outsourced. Team is a dummy
variable that equals one if the fund is team-managed. log(Size) is the logarithm of TNA of
fund. log(FaFd) is the logarithm of the number of funds in fund family. log(FaSiz) is the
logarithm of one plus the TNA of the family that the fund belongs to, excluding its own
TNA. Expense is the annual expense ratio over the fund’s assets under management. Age
is the number of years since the inception of the fund. Flow is the percentage of new fund
flow into the fund over the previous 12 months. CumRet is the cumulative gross return
over the previous 12 months. All characteristic variables are demeaned. The sample period
is from January 2009 to December 2016.
Timing Picking
Outsourcet−1 0.010 0.008 0.023 0.019
t-Stat 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.03
Teamt−1 -0.212 -0.205 0.519 0.520
t-Stat -1.55 -1.51 2.01 1.93
Expenset−1 0.364 0.314 -0.409 -0.376
t-Stat 0.66 0.48 -1.45 -1.04
log(FaFd)t−1 -0.063 0.201
t-Stat -0.20 0.82
Log(Size)t−1 -0.029 -0.016 -0.023 -0.029
t-Stat -0.73 -0.75 -0.38 -0.64
log(FaSiz)t−1 -0.057 -0.018
t-Stat -1.12 -0.43
Aget−1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.014 -0.012
t-Stat -0.80 -0.85 -1.17 -1.22
CumRett−1 -0.041 -0.042 -0.183 -0.187
t-Stat -0.18 -0.13 -1.18 -1.31
Flowt−1 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.006
t-Stat 1.87 1.93 1.41 1.08
Recessiont−1 1.428 1.294 1.290 0.041 0.037 0.041
t-Stat 2.52 2.16 2.19 0.11 0.46 0.44
Constant 0.014 0.046 0.049 0.038 0.035 0.034
t-Stat 0.74 1.68 1.63 1.20 1.06 1.01
N 2512 1850 1850 2512 1850 1850
Fund fixed effect
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RE_Gl
Figure 1: Three-year Rolling Window Alpha and Beta Estimates Relative to
Global Market: the figure shows the 36-month rolling window coefficient estimates and
associated 95% CI of equal-weighted portfolio of all GREMFs, net of expenses, relative to
global FF 3-factor model augmented with domestic RE and orthogonalised global RE factors
for the period 1992-2016.
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A Appendix
A.1 GREMFs Portfolio Exposure
The GREMFs in CRSP, defined by Lipper investment objectives, only starts their
existence from 2008, because Lipper introduced the classification on GREMFs since
then. Other studies tend to trace back funds’ returns history, assuming no changes on
their risk exposures. However, this assumption might be problematic, because funds
may convert their investment objectives from domestic to global. Thus, we reclassify
GREMFs using Lipper’s definition, once their portfolio holdings are identified. All
securities held by DREMF and GREMF portfolios are identified manually in this
study using the domiciled country and industry classification from Datastream, the
CUSIP Master File, Bloomberg, and Financial Times. For those funds with portfolio
information missing in CRSP, we use the N-30D or N-Q filling from EDGAR21 on-
line database to fill in the gaps. In addition, there are some funds that altered
their investment objectives from U.S. domestic to global or international. Part of
their returns will be included into sample once it meets the Lipper classification of
non-U.S. stock exposure more than 25%.
A.2 Exclusion of Index Funds
To ensure our results are purely driven by fund manager active management, we also
remove the passively operated index funds, by using the ‘index fund flag’ identifier
in the CRSP database. However, strict use of this method would omit some index
funds whose inception dates are prior to 2008, because this identifier only became
available after June 2008. Thus, before 2008, we consider a fund as an index fund
only if the fund’s name contains ‘Index’, ‘Idx’, ‘Ix’, ‘Indx’, ‘NASDAQ’, ‘Nasdaq’,
‘Dow’, ‘Mkt’, ‘DJ’, ‘S & P 500’, ‘BARRA’. The use of this index dummy has been
proven accurate for an index fund coverage by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009).
21The EDGAR database is compiled by SEC from the mandatory filings along with the fund’s
voluntarily disclosure.
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